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Whether assessing the accuracy of expert forecasting, the pros and cons of group communication, 
or the value of evidence in diagnostic or predictive reasoning, dependencies between experts, 
group members, or evidence have traditionally been seen as a form of redundancy. We 
demonstrate that this conception of dependence conflates the structure of a dependency network, 
and the observations across this network. By disentangling these two elements we show, via 
mathematical proof and specific examples, that there are cases where dependencies yield an 
informational advantage over independence. More precisely, when a structural dependency 
exists, but observations are either partial or contradicting, these observations provide more 
support to a hypothesis than when this structural dependency does not exist, ceterus paribus. 
Furthermore, we show that lay reasoners endorse sufficient assumptions underpinning these 
advantageous structures yet fail to appreciate their implications for probability judgements and 
belief revision. 
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“Surely, Mr. Lincoln,” said I, “that is a strong corroboration of the news I bring you.” He smiled 
and shook his head. “That is exactly why I was about you about names. If different persons, not 
knowing of each other’s work, have been pursuing separate clews that led to the same result, why 
then it shows there may be something in it. But if this is only the same story, filtered through two 
channels, and reaching me in two ways, then that don’t make it any stronger. Don’t you see?” 
William Seward (1877) 
Consider the following scenario: a plane has crashed, and you must determine whether it 
was sabotage. You await the crash site reports from two investigators, Bailey and Campbell. They 
have separately assessed the various pieces of wreckage before leaving to write up their 
conclusions. Both investigators are equally accurate in their conclusions, seldom making 
mistakes. Now consider two alternative cases: 
i. Bailey provides a report in which she concludes the plane was sabotaged, but she has also 
seen Campbell’s report, in which Campbell likewise concluded that the plane was 
sabotaged. 
ii. Bailey provides a report in which she concludes the plane was sabotaged, based on her 
assessment alone. Campbell then separately provides a report (based on his assessment 
alone), likewise concluding that the plane was sabotaged. 
Here, i) is a case of corroborating reports with a directional dependence from Campbell to Bailey 
(i.e., Bailey has seen Campbell’s report, thus Bailey’s report may depend upon Campbell’s, but 
not vice-versa), and ii) is a case of corroborating reports coming from independent sources. Given 
the two reports in each case (ceterus paribus), it would be right to conclude that more support for 
the conclusion that the plane was sabotaged is provided in the independent case. Indeed this is 
how dependencies have traditionally been viewed (see e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980): namely, as a 




compromising influence that makes additional evidence redundant. However, now consider the 
same scenario, with two slight alterations: 
1. Bailey reports to you the plane was sabotaged, having seen Campbell’s report, but 
you do not know what Campbell concluded (case i), versus you only know Bailey’s 
independent conclusion of sabotage (case ii). 
2. Bailey reports to you the plane was sabotaged, having seen Campbell’s report, but 
you know that Campbell concluded the opposite (case i), versus you only know that 
Bailey and Campbell have independently provided contradictory conclusions (case 
ii). 
1) is an instance of partial information, and 2) an instance of contradicting information. In both 
these instances, it is less clear whether case i) or ii) provides more support for the sabotage 
hypothesis. In the present paper, we demonstrate that for partial or contradicting information, the 
dependent case (i) is, in fact, superior (i.e., there is a dependency advantage, in that more 
evidential support is provided to the hypothesis when a report is the result of a structural 
dependency (i) than when independent (ii)) – at least given reasonable assumptions. 
1.1. Dependence in Evidential Reasoning 
Dependence has been considered in many forms. For groups, it has often been conceptualised as 
the degree of correlation between group member judgments, including juries (Berg, 1993; 1994; 
Ladha, 1995) and voting populations (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977; Hogarth, 1978; 
Jönsson, Hahn, & Olsson, 2015; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Hahn, von Sydow, & Merdes, 2019). 
In the case of evidential reasoning, there are three primary forms of dependence: dependence as 
a shared background or reliability (e.g., economists found to have been educated in the same 
(weak) school; see Madsen, Hahn, & Pilditch, 2018; but also Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), 
dependence as direct information flow between sources (the focus of the present paper, but see 




also instances of conferring between witnesses or suspects; Wagenaar, Van Koppen, & Crombag, 
1993), and dependence as shared evidence (Schum, 1994) – as outlined by Lincoln above1.  
Lincoln’s supposition on the nature of dependence fits with the general consensus across 
multiple literatures: the evidential and causal reasoning literature (Pearl, 1988; 2009; Schum, 
1994; Rehder, 2014), expert forecasting (Hogarth, 1989; Soll, 1999) and the literatures on applied 
domains of reasoning such as medicine (Kononenko, 1993), law and forensics (Wagenaar, et al., 
1993; Bex & Prakken, 2004; Dawid & Evett, 1997; Schum, 1994), risk analysis (Smith, Ryan, & 
Evans, 1992; Clemen & Winkler, 1999), and intelligence analysis (Spellman, 2011). This general 
consensus – that dependence is inferior to independence – has been based on instances of 
corroboration. Put another way, the issue of whether multiple items of evidence, reports, votes, 
or judgments are to some degree dependent is only raised given they have been observed saying 
the same thing. This is not surprising: contradictory reports might themselves be seen as evidence 
against dependence; and partial information (only observing a subset of the reports) may often 
leave the existence of a dependency unclear. From that perspective, it makes sense to formally 
treat dependence solely as a matter of correlations between outcomes, such as the content of 
reports, without consideration of how those outcomes come about; and this has, indeed, been the 
common strategy in the literature on collective judgment (see e.g., Berg, 1993; Ladha, 1995; Soll, 
1999; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Hahn, et al., 2018; but for a discussion of the general difficulties 
of assessing dependencies, see Clemen, Fischer, & Winkler, 2000). However, as we show in this 
paper, this is not enough. 
A fully adequate treatment of the normative implications of dependence requires 
consideration of structure; that is, explicit modelling of the connections between pieces of 
evidence that give rise to their specific content. To illustrate the varying impact of dependence, 
 
1 In fact, the example of Bailey and Campbell can be considered an instance where there is shared evidence across 
cases. However, we highlight that the key comparison remains the presence or absence of a direct dependence 
between the investigators. 




and more generally model the integration of evidence, we turn to Bayesian Networks (BNs). 
These provide graphical representations of evidence-hypothesis structure, based on probabilistic 
dependency relations between variables (Pearl, 1988). In general, the Bayesian framework 
provides a characterization of optimal inference in the sense that Bayesian inference minimises 
the inaccuracies of one’s beliefs (Pettigrew, 2016). In that sense, it provides a normative 
characterisation of what reasoners should ideally do. BNs in turn are a tool for simplifying the 
required Bayesian computations by exploiting dependence relations between variables. Hence 
BNs not only support optimal inferences when reasoning under uncertainty (Pearl, 2009), but 
also allow one to capture, by design, the impact of (at least certain types of) dependencies on 
complex inferences (see Schum, 1994).  
The generic case of a direct dependency is illustrated in Fig. 1b, where a hypothesis H 
(e.g., ‘sabotage’) is informed by two sources, SB (Bailey) and SC (Campbell), who provide a 
report to the effect that the claim at issue (sabotage) is either true or false. The difference between 
case a) and b) is shown by the dashed arrow from SC to SB. This represents the presence of the 
directional dependency (Bailey receiving information from Campbell). 
 
Figure 1a and 1b. Graphical representation of a hypothesis (H) with two sources of evidence (SB, SC) 
informing upon it. Fig. 1a (left) is the independent case, with the two sources reporting entirely separately. 
Fig. 1b illustrates the possible dependency from SC to SB (dashed line). The presence of a directed arrow 
indicates that the receiving node (SB) is (directly) probabilistically dependent on the node at the arrow’s 
origin (SC).  
 
Underpinning this graphical representation are a set of conditional probability tables (CPTs) 
associated with each node. These probabilities characterize precisely the variables and relations 




between them: in the case of Fig. 1, the CPT associated with H will contain the prior probability 
of H (conditioned on any background information); the CPT associated with SC contains the 
conditional probabilities of SC given both H and not H; and the CPT associated with SB is either 
identical to SC (Fig. 1a, independent case) or contains the conditional probabilities of observing 
the different possible states of SB as a function of the states of both SC and H (Fig. 1b, dependent 
case). The graph and CPTs (which collectively define the BN) can then be used to calculate, via 
Bayes’ rule, the influence of sources on the likelihood of the hypothesis being true.  
 Consequently, this formal framework is ideal for representing both general constraints on 
sources (such that more reliable2 sources exert greater influence on the hypothesis) and for 
representing dependencies between sources. This then allows us to determine how rational agents 
should respond to the different cases outlined above.  
 
1.2. Advantageous Dependence 
There are many possible considerations when determining the nature of a dependency. For 
instance, to what degree does background information play a role in message passing between 
sources? Or in the accurate detection of the hypothesis in the first place? Are sources aware of 
their own or their fellow source’s reliability? Such considerations are highly context-dependent, 
and speak to the difficulty of extricating a general rule of dependencies from the background 
information that surrounds it (Schum, 1994). However, here we seek to demonstrate that: 
1. There exist cases that lead to an advantageous effect of a dependency (relative to an 
independent equivalent, ceteris paribus), resting on reasonable assumptions.  
 
2 In the present paper, reliability is taken to be synonymous with accuracy, i.e., a higher reliability source is less 
error-prone (for other Bayesian network representations of reliability see e.g., Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013; Hahn, 
Harris, & Corner, 2016). 




2. When faced with such cases, participants endorse these assumptions, but do not infer the 
consequence (that the dependent structure is more advantageous). 
1.2.1. Where is Dependence Advantageous? 
Crucial to understanding where and when dependency advantages exist in cases such as the 
examples above, is appreciation of the impact of structure on them. What does this mean? It 
means appreciating that while there is a directional dependency such that Bailey’s report is 
influenced by Campbell’s, Campbell is not influenced by Bailey (see Fig. 1a vs 1b). The 
evidential value of Campbell’s report is the same across the dependent and independent case. 
Whether or not there is a dependency advantage or disadvantage thus rests on the nature of 
Campbell’s impact on Bailey. If seeing Campbell’s report makes Bailey’s report “better”, then 
the dependency will be advantageous.  
Crucially, the normative Bayesian framework makes clear that the evidential value (or 
‘diagnosticity’) of a piece of evidence depends on the relationship between two cases: how likely 
that evidence would be if the hypothesis were true and how likely it would be if the hypothesis 
were false. Likewise, whether Bailey’s report has greater evidential value when it depends (in 
part) on Campbell’s depends both on the increase in accuracy when Campbell’s report is true and 
the decrease in accuracy when Campbell misreports.  
In the case of corroboration, this boils down simply to whether the potential benefits 
outweigh the costs to Bailey’s accuracy: if Campbell’s report increases accuracy more (when 
true) than it decreases accuracy (when false), then the two corroborating reports will provide 
stronger evidence in the dependent than the independent case. In other words, there will be a 
dependency advantage (see Appendix A and C for formal details, and Appendix B for 
visualisation).  
In the case of contradictory reports, the evidence points in opposite directions. Where 
Bailey and Campbell are otherwise equally competent, their reports will simply cancel out in the 




independent case. If the dependency weakens the evidential value of Bailey’s testimony, 
however, then Bailey’s conflicting report will counteract Campbell’s to a lesser degree. So a 
dependency disadvantage for corroboration can become a contradiction advantage: the 
conflicting reports provide stronger evidence for the hypothesis in the dependent than 
independent case (see Appendix A and C for formal details). 
In the partial information case, finally, we do not know, as it were, which world we are 
in:  the one where Campbell’s report corroborates Bailey’s or the one where Campbell contradicts 
her. As a result, the benefits (or costs) of the dependency are based on the expectation over these 
two cases (see Appendix C for formal details).   
These basic considerations make clear not only that dependency may, in the right 
circumstances, be beneficial, but also that the same circumstances can give rise to complex 
patterns of advantage/disadvantage across the corroboration, contradiction, and partial 
information cases. 
To illustrate this further, Fig. 2 takes the two cases of the sabotage scenario, represents 
them in a BN fitted with parameters in line with two assumptions: sources are generally reliable 
(assumption 1; in this case error rates of independent sources are 20%), and dependencies reduce 
recipient error rates when correct information is provided by the sender (assumption 2; 20% error 
probability decreases to 10%).  The left versus right hand columns represent dependence versus 
independence, and different rows represent different information states from initial state (top 
row) through the partial information case (middle row t1) through to the contradicting information 
case (row t2) stages. 
 





Figure 2. Bayesian Network illustrations of sabotage scenario, with independent (right-hand column) and 
dependent (left-hand column) cases. The top row (t0) represents the sabotage scenario before any reports 
are observed. “Sabotage” is the underlying hypothesis at issue, and the other two variables are Bailey’s 
and Campbell’s reports. Blue bars and percentages indicate the respective probabilities for the possible 
states of those variables: e.g., the prior probability of sabotage (sabotage = T) is 50%; likewise, there is 
maximal uncertainty on whether Bailey and Campbell will report that there was sabotage (T) or that there 
was not (F). The middle row (t1) represents a partial information state: we have observed Bailey’s report 
(T) indicating sabotage, but have not yet observed Campbell’s report. The new percentages indicate the 
updated probabilities in light of Bailey’s report. Finally, in the bottom-row (t2) we have now also observed 
Campbell’s contradicting report (F), indicating it was not sabotage. Assumptions: P(Sabotage) = .5; 
Independent source error rates (P(T|¬Sabotage), P(F|Sabotage)) are all equal to .2; a dependency 
(Campbell to Bailey, left-hand column) entails a conditional halving (when Campbell is correct) and 





3 Figure created using the AgenaRisk Bayesian Network software (AgenaRisk, 2018). 




What types of advantage/disadvantage exist in each case (corroboration, contradiction, partial 
information) will depend on the specific probabilities involved. However, the two conditions just 
outlined point to a particularly interesting region of the probability space. Where sources are 
more accurate than not, and where the additional information provided by Campbell helps, there 
will be broad regions of the parameter space where there are dependency advantages in the partial 
information case and in the contradictory information case.  
We present a formal proof to illustrate dependency advantages for these two cases in the 
appendix. This proof demonstrates a dependency advantage for the partial case4 in the sense that:  
P(H|SB-Dep) > P(H|SB-Ind)             (P1) 
In words, evidence provided by SB will lead to a greater degree of belief in H (starting from the 
same prior, P(H)) in the dependent model.  
It is necessary to highlight the assumptions that underpin these advantages, both to make 
the theoretical point that such advantages can reasonably occur, but further to identify the 
components to be endorsed (or not) by lay reasoners. We additionally note at this point that it 
remains possible that other assumptions (not detailed here) may also exist that can produce 
dependency advantages, but for the present case we use the worked through assumptions and 
proof to show this effect in principle. These two assumptions are:  
1. “Sending” sources are generally accurate in the minimal sense that they more often 
provide correct information than not. More formally:  
P(SC|H) > 0.5            (A1) 
2. “Recipient” sources are assisted by the provision of correct information from the 
“sender”:  
 
4 We note that in all the following probability formula, for a variable X (e.g., H, SC, SB, etc.), we take X to mean “X 
is true”, and ¬X to mean “X is false”. 




  P(SB-Dep|H, SC) > P(SB-Ind|H)            (A2)  
In words, these assumptions mean that sending sources are more likely to be accurate than 
inaccurate (i.e., be more likely to say “H is True” than “H is False” when H is in fact true, and 
more likely to say “H is False” than “H is True” when H is in fact false; assumption 1), and that 
a source evaluating first-hand evidence is less likely to make a mistake when also provided with 
access to correct information from another source (assumption 2). Arguably these assumptions 
are met the majority of the time in human communication: were they not, communication would 
not be worthwhile and it would be difficult to see why human beings evolved and continue to 
sustain such elaborate (and costly) communication. Hence, we argue these assumptions are 
reasonable approximations of dependency scenarios in both lay and professional contexts.  
Finally, as the starting accuracy of sources drops close to the 0.5 threshold, a third 
assumption is needed to guarantee the dependency advantage, namely that:  
3. “Recipient” sources should not be misled to a greater degree by incorrect information 
from a sender than they are assisted by correct information from a sender:  
(P(SB-Dep|H, SC) - P(SB-Ind|H)) > (P(SB-Ind|H) - P(SB-Dep|H, ¬SC)).                        (A3)  
For the interested reader, the full functional form of these assumptions is detailed in Appendix 
A, and the mathematical proof demonstrating the dependency advantages that follow from them 
are contained in Appendix C, along with visualisations in B. To further illustrate these 
assumptions, consider again the case of Investigators Bailey, Campbell, the crashed plane, and 
the numerical example of Fig. 2: 
Each investigator looks through the wreckage, noting details and features (e.g., state of 
control surfaces, fuel lines, engine, etc.), collating these to form their respective individual 
assessment of sabotage. In this process, there will be differences between Bailey and Campbell 




in terms of a) the clues perceived, and b) the manner in which these clues are integrated to form 
a judgment, for example, Bailey and Campbell may have complementary expertise. 
Now, let us first consider Bailey in the independent versus dependent case. In the former, 
she only has access to the clues she has gathered, and the way she has marshalled those clues to 
form her own judgment. In the latter, she not only has access to the above, but also has access to 
Campbell’s judgment. Next, we consider the two critical assumptions. We know that Campbell 
generally provides accurate information (assumption 1). We also know that given accurate 
information, Bailey is less likely to make a mistake (and thus provide more support to the 
hypothesis) than if she did not have such information (assumption 2). One might imagine, for 
example, that Campbell accurately observes clues (or provides sound arguments) that point 
Bailey in the correct direction (e.g., Campbell catches a critical clue that Bailey missed) or Bailey 
is aware that Campbell will better understand the significance of a particular aspect given his 
expertise. As a result, Bailey is more likely to be accurate in her reporting given Campbell’s 
assistance, that is, in the dependent case. Importantly, we may know this even though we have 
not yet observed Campbell’s report. Finally, even where Campbell is wrong, Bailey may still 
provide useful evidence, because the part of the judgment that is based on her own expertise is 
unaffected, so that even though she becomes less accurate overall, her report still has diagnostic 
value. In short, dependency advantages may exist under reasonable assumptions.  
1.3. Present Research 
Although this paper seeks to make the theoretical point that dependency can be advantageous, 
thus providing a corrective to previous claims in the literature, we also seek to determine how 
such advantageous instances are understood by lay reasoners. More precisely, we seek to 
determine whether lay reasoners a) endorse assumptions that entail such advantages, and b) 
reason appropriately in such cases (namely correctly identifying a dependency advantage, where 
one exists).  




Assumption 1 - that the sending source Campbell is generally reliable - is provided 
directly to participants in the scenario description. However, both assumption 2 - that a recipient 
source is assisted (i.e., chance of error is reduced) by correct information from a sending source, 
and assumption 3 – that the degree of assistance outweighs the degree to which incorrect 
information misleads the recipient (i.e., increases error rates), are elicited directly from 
participants by asking for conditional probability estimates regarding the influence of the sending 
source (Campbell) on the recipient source (Bailey). 
We expect that while participants may endorse these intuitive underlying assumptions, 
they will remain ignorant of the implied dependency advantages, instead showing a blanket 
preference for independence (e.g., Schum & Martin, 1982) or remain ignorant of the impact of 
(in)dependence altogether (e.g., Soll, 1999). 
In Experiment 1 we test this in a baseline case where the two equally reliable sources 
either share information (dependent case), or remain independent. Experiment 2 then strengthens 
these findings via extended replication. We then build on this in Experiment 3, where the 
reliabilities of the two sources differ from one another. This third experiment is motivated not 
only by the desire to better map onto real-world cases (seldom are sources exactly equally 
reliable), but also to determine whether differences in reliability alter participants’ assumptions 
and judgments regarding the nature of dependencies. 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to determine several interrelated points. Firstly, we sought to examine 
how well lay people’s assumptions about the impact of a direct dependency between sources fit 
with the conditions outlined above. Do lay people understand, as our proof shows, that under 
certain information states (partial or contradicting), dependencies can provide an evidential 
advantage (relative to an independent equivalent)? Secondly, given their own stated assumptions, 
are lay people sensitive to the conditions under which a direct dependency is advantageous, or 




do they adopt a blanket aversion to them? To explore this, we use a version of the plane crash 
scenario outlined above. 
2.1. Method 
Participants. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, 200 US participants were recruited and 
participated online. Participants were native English speakers5, with a median age of 33 years (SD 
= 11.06). 107 participants identified as female. Participants were paid $1.00 for their time (Median 
= 8.47 minutes, SD = 5.97). 
Procedure & Design. Participants were presented with the plane crash outlined above (and 
illustrated in part in Fig. 2). Critically, participants were provided with a prior probability of the 
plane having crashed due to sabotage (P(Sabotage) = 0.5), along with reliability statistics for the 
two independent investigators, Bailey and Campbell (error rates – both false positive and false 
negative – of 20%6) when independent. 
The procedure started with participants providing basic demographics (age, gender, 
location, and native language) before reading through the plane crash scenario (a full copy of 
these materials can be found in Supplementary Materials A) and providing conditional 
probabilities for their assumptions regarding the influence of a direct dependency on the 
reliability of a recipient source (Bailey). These conditional probability questions consisted of two 
‘if… then’ statements, wherein participants needed to provide a probability (0-100) of Bailey 
making an error given correct or erroneous information from Campbell. Participants were 
provided with reminders that both Bailey and Campbell have the same 20% error rates when 
independent of each other when asked about the dependent case, specifically: 
 
5 202 participants were originally recruited, but 2 were removed for not being based in the US nor being a native 
English speaker. 
6 I.e., P(SB|¬Sabotage) = P(¬SB|Sabotage) = P(SC|¬Sabotage) = P(¬SC|Sabotage) = 0.2 




1. “If Bailey, before making her report, has seen Campbell's completed report - when that 
report is in fact CORRECT - what do you estimate is the probability of Bailey making a 
mistake now?” 
2. “If Bailey, before making her report, has seen Campbell's completed report - when that 
report is in fact INCORRECT - what do you estimate is the probability of Bailey making 
a mistake now?” 
These error rates for Bailey represent respectively (in the dependent case): 
1. The conditional probabilities, P(SB=Sabotage | SC=Accident, H=Accident), that Bailey 
wrongly concludes sabotage despite being passed correct information from Campbell, 
and P(SB=Accident | SC=Sabotage, H=Sabotage), that Bailey wrongly concludes accident 
despite being passed correct information from Campbell; and   
2. The conditional probabilities, P(SB=Sabotage | SC=Sabotage, H=Accident), that Bailey 
wrongly concludes sabotage when given erroneous information from Campbell, and 
P(SB=Accident | SC=Accident, H=Sabotage), that Bailey wrongly concludes accident 
when given erroneous information from Campbell.7  
These conditional probabilities represent the key assumptions of the participant regarding the 
influence of the dependency, and for each participant are fed into individually-fitted BN models, 
such that optimal inferences could be determined for comparison, given the participant’s own 
background assumptions. 
Following the elicitation of conditional probabilities, participants saw the two comparison cases 
(dependent/independent) laid out above8. The specific wording of these were:  
 
7 These possibilities are symmetric in all experiments. 
8 Here we use the term “cases” to remain consistent in terminology throughout, however in the participant materials, 
“cases” were labelled “scenarios”. 




Case 1: “You learn that Bailey, prior to completing her report, was accidentally given 
access to Campbell's completed report. As such, Bailey's report may be influenced by 
what Campbell has reported.”  
Case 2: “You learn that Bailey completed her report without ever seeing Campbell's 
completed report. As such, Bailey's report is not influenced by what Campbell has 
reported.” 
Where case 1 is the dependent case, and case 2 the independent case. 
Participants then compared these two cases using a qualitative comparison judgment: 
“Based on what you know at this point, which case (if either) provides more support for 
the plane having been sabotaged?” [“They are the same.” / “Case 1” / “Case 2”]. 
with the presentation order of those response options randomized across participants. 
Participants then provided a confidence in that judgment: 
“How confident are you that your response is correct?” [Slider, 0 – 100%.]. 
And, finally, they provided probability estimates of the likelihood of sabotage in each case: 
“What is your current probability estimate of sabotage in each case, given what you know 
so far?” [Sliders from 0-100%.] 
Crucially, these questions were asked across three time-points: 
• t0 (Baseline): No reports from either investigator (only the background context – 
structure and parameters – have been provided).  
• t1 (First report): Bailey gives a positive (sabotage) report. 
• t2 (Second report): Campbell gives either a corroborating (sabotage) or contradicting 
(no sabotage) report. 




In other words, t0 assesses the extent to which participants agree with the interpretation of the 
scenario context (i.e., given a full understanding of the context, do they still agree that 
P(Sabotage) = 50%?), t1 represents a state of partial information, and t2 represents a state of 
complete corroborating or complete contradicting information. 




Bayesian statistics were employed throughout9 using the JASP statistical software (JASP Team, 
2018).  
2.2.1. Conditional probabilities  
As illustrated in Fig. 3, participants generally increased their estimates of Bailey’s error rate when 
the secondary source Campbell is incorrect (median (red dashed line in Fig. 3) = 36%) – albeit 
with substantial variance (a likely marker of the differences in the way in which individuals 
determine background information); at the same time, they reduced their estimates of  Bailey’s 
error rate when provided with correct information from the secondary source (median (green 
dashed line in Fig. 3) = 15%).  
To assess deviation from the starting (independent) reliability value of 20%, Bayesian t-
tests were conducted on each conditional probability (in comparison to a test value of 20). Given 
the significant right-hand skew (evident in Fig. 3, and further evidenced by a Shapiro-Wilk p-
values < .001), all estimates (and corresponding test value) were log transformed (x -> log(x +1) 
to account for 0 values, resulting in a test value of 1.322) before analysing. The analysis found 
 
9 Whilst Bayes Factors (BF10: likelihood ratio of data given hypothesis, over data given null) > 3 may be considered 
substantial support for the alternative hypothesis, Bayes Factors < .33 are considered substantial support for the null 
(Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). For all analyses, an uninformative prior was used, unless otherwise specified. Wherever 
possible, sample sizes for a given analysis (N), and Bayesian Credibility Intervals (95% CI) are indicated. 




that estimates of the impact of an “incorrect” secondary source showed decisive evidence for an 
increased estimation of error (N = 200; M = 1.518, 95% CI: [1.447, 1.558]), BF10 = 8.06 * 10
14. 
Conversely, the impact of a “correct” secondary source on error rates showed decisive evidence 
for a decrease10 (N = 200; M = 1.194, 95% CI: [1.142, 1.247]), BF10 = 3670.9.  
 
Figure 3. Density plots of the elicited conditional probabilities of the expected error rate for a dependent 
source (Bailey) with a standard (independent) error rate of 20% (vertical solid black line), when provided 
with correct (green) or incorrect (red) information from a second source (Campbell). 
 
Using the gRain package in R (Højsgaard, 2012), the conditional probabilities elicited from each 
participant were used to fit the amended error rates for Bailey (as a recipient / dependent source) 
in a dependent case BN, creating individually fitted BNs for each participant (hereafter termed 
Behaviorally Informed Bayesian Networks; BIBNs). Each participant thus has a dependent and 
independent BIBN model, with the parameters drawn either from elicited conditional 
probabilities (Bailey in the dependent model, as explained above), or drawn from the parameters 
stated in the scenario description provided to participants (e.g., the prior probability of sabotage). 
 
10 It is worth noting that the large variance exhibited in the elicited conditional probabilities (and notably when a 
source receives incorrect information) may be reflective of participant interpretations of the impact of background 
information inherent to considerations of dependence (Schum 1994).  




The posterior probabilities and qualitative judgments for each case (at each elicitation stage) 
generated from each BIBN model (representing each participant) were used in subsequent 
comparison analyses.  
2.2.2. Qualitative judgments 
To analyze participants’ qualitative judgments of which of the two cases provided more support 
for the sabotage hypotheses (response options: dependent, independent, or “same”), a series of 
Bayesian contingency tables (to assess factors) were used to firstly compare participant 
judgments across elicitation stages (t0(Baseline), t1(First Report), and t2(Second Report)), and 
conditions (contradicting vs corroborating second reports).  
We then sought to assess whether or not participants’ judgments deviated from the 
normative model (as in, e.g., Harris et al., 2014). Participant judgments were compared to the 
fitted BIBN model predictions on the group level across elicitation stages, before then also being 
compared on the individual level in terms of internal coherence, using Binomial tests for 
comparing correct responding to chance. 
 




Figure 4. Frequency plots of qualitative comparison judgments, split by elicitation stage (t0, t1, t2). 
Corroborating and Contradicting second report conditions also shown. Dark bars represent participant 
responses, grey bars represent corresponding responses generated from the individually fitted Bayes net 
models (BIBN). Dashed line represents chance level (33%). 
 
Participant Judgments. Turning first to participant judgments (dark grey bars, Fig. 4) across 
elicitation stages and conditions, a judgment (3) x elicitation stage (3) contingency table (N = 
600), found substantial evidence for an effect of elicitation stage on participant judgments, BF10 
= 5.72. In other words, participants’ judgments of which case provided more support shifted as 
new evidence was presented. Further, when comparing the effect of condition on judgments, very 
strong evidence was found (N = 200), BF10 = 31.97, that participants were influenced by whether 
the second report corroborated or contradict the first: judgments of the independent case were 
more frequently taken to support the sabotage hypothesis. These results in effect serve to 
demonstrate a successful manipulation of evidence presentation. 
Model Comparisons. We next compared the distribution of participants’ judgments to those 
derived from the normative model. Specifically, we used the individually fitted BIBNs (light grey 
bars, Fig. 4) to generate the response distribution we should have seen, had participants’ 
responded in line with their respective BIBNs.  A series of Bayesian contingency tables were 
then used with a “data type” (Participant vs. BIBN prediction) factor. These analyses were 
conducted across the three elicitation stages (separating contradicting and corroborating 
conditions in the second report stage). In so doing, decisive evidence was found for the deviation 
of participant judgments from BIBN model predictions at baseline, t0 (N = 400), BF10 = 3.59 * 
1025, and first report, t1 (N = 400), BF10 = 9.0 * 10
6, stages. The former of these highlights that 
some participants did not consider the two cases (dependent or independent) to be the same prior 
to observing any evidence. This could reflect an interpretation that there is some form of pre-




emptive comparison of the cases, or could be an artifact of inattentive responding. The difference 
at the first report stage is, however, particularly notable; the trend of judgment preferences for 
participants (“Same”, then “Independent”, then lastly, “Dependent”) is the mirror opposite of the 
judgments expected according to the BIBN models, where dependence is in fact the modal 
preference. This finding speaks to the failure of participants to understand the normative 
implications of their own assumptions when dealing with partial evidence (and their naïve 
undervaluing of dependent evidence as a consequence). 
Finally, when turning to the comparison of participant judgments and model predictions 
at the second report stage, t2, both corroborating (N = 200), BF10 = 81188.76, and contradicting 
(N = 200), BF10 = 1.27 * 10
6, conditions reveal decisive evidence for group level proportions of 
judgments deviating from those predicted by participant BIBNs. In the corroborating condition, 
participants’ majority response matched that of the BIBNs in viewing the independent case as 
stronger (albeit to an insufficient degree). In the contradicting condition, however, the rank order 
of participant preferences over response options “same/independent stronger/dependent 
stronger” incorrectly matched those of the partial information case (t1), and, as there, they 
undervalued the strength of the dependent case (with it, once again, being the least preferred 
option), which in both cases should have been the most prevalent response according to the 
BIBNs. 
Internal Coherence. To determine which participant judgments were erroneous (e.g., whether 
judgments of independence were more typically incorrect), the degree of internal coherence 
between participant judgments and BIBN model predictions was assessed on the individual level, 
with a “coherence” variable created for each participant judgment. This variable was either 
correct (1) – the participant judgment matches the model prediction, or else incorrect (0) and was 
then used to determine if participants made correct judgments more often than expected by 
chance (0.33) across elicitation stages and conditions, using Binomial tests.  




At baseline, t0, correct responding (internal coherence) occurred decisively above chance 
levels (0.59, 95% CI: [0.52, 0.66]; N = 200), BF10 = 1.68 * 10
11. However, at the first report stage, 
strong evidence for the null (no difference from chance) was found (0.34, 95% CI: [0.28, 0.41]; 
N = 200), BF10 = 0.088, again reflective of the overlooking of the dominant dependent case in 
states of partial information. Similarly, substantial evidence was found for correct responding 
above chance level when the second report was corroborative (0.46, 95% CI: [0.36, 0.55]; N = 
100), BF10 = 3.39, but when the second report was contradicting, correct responding showed 
substantial evidence for the null (no difference from chance; 0.36, 95% CI: [0.27, 0.45]; N = 
100), BF10 = 0.14. This latter pair of results, again, indicate a failure to appreciate a dependency 
advantage (in this case when evidence is contradictory). 
2.2.3. Confidence in Qualitative Judgments 
The confidence in qualitative judgments was generally high across all judgments (M = 67.49, SD 
= 23.84). Using a Bayesian ANOVA (N = 600), confidence was shown to be unaffected by 
judgment, BFInclusion
11 = .49, elicitation stage, BFInclusion = .014 (substantial evidence for the null), 
or their interaction, BFInclusion = .001 (decisive evidence for the null). Confidence was, however, 
decisively higher when second reports (N = 200) were corroborative (M = 74.4, SD = 23.61) 
rather than contradicting (M = 60.88, SD = 25.26), BF10 = 163.39. This finding fits with the higher 
erroneous responding found in qualitative judgments when evidence is contradictory, and the 
more general argument that contradicting evidence is harder to integrate. 
2.2.4. Probability estimates 
We next turn to participant probability estimates. At each time step, participants estimated the 
probability of sabotage given the evidence presented so far – for both the dependent and 
independent cases. Using Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA, participant estimates were first 
compared across elicitation stages and conditions, and then later compared to the estimates 
 
11 BFInclusion is the change in odds from the sum of prior probabilities to the sum of posterior probabilities across 
models that include the effect. 




derived from their BIBN models. Fig. 5 below shows the mean estimates for dependent (grey 
lines) and independent (black lines) case participant estimates (solid lines), BIBN estimates 
(dashed lines) across elicitation stages (within-facet), and conditions (facets). 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean participant estimates of the probability of sabotage across elicitation stages (t0, t1, t2), 
split by contradicting vs corroborating second report conditions. Dashed lines reflect BIBN model 
predictions, whilst solid lines reflect participant estimates. Grey lines illustrate probability estimates for 
the dependent case, and black lines probability estimates for the independent case. Error bars reflect 
standard error. 
 
Participant Estimates. A Bayesian, repeated-measures ANOVA, including all relevant factors 
(within: case type, elicitation stage; between: condition) was run in a hierarchical model on 
participant probability estimates (N = 1200). The model including main effects for elicitation 




stage, case type, and condition, as well as the interactions of elicitation stage x condition and case 
type x condition, enjoyed the strongest support, BFM = 56.25, with decisive evidence overall, 
BF10 = 2.62 * 10
44. This model is hereafter referred to as ModelP. Looking at the effect terms, 
independent cases (black solid lines, Fig. 5) were considered to provide more support than 
dependent equivalents (grey solid lines, Fig. 5), BFInclusion = 7.27, substantiating qualitative 
judgment findings. There was also a main effect of elicitation stage (linearly increasing estimates 
across stages), BFInclusion > 150, indicating participants were generally sensitive to incoming 
information, including the impact of contradictory vs corroborating information, BFInclusion > 150 
(decisive evidence was found for the elicitation stage x condition interaction in ModelP, along 
with a decisive main effect of condition, BFInclusion > 150). 
Lastly, motivated by the evidenced case type x condition interaction in ModelP (BFInclusion 
= 8.08), two separate Bayesian ANOVAs were conducted on estimates in the second report 
elicitation state, split by condition, testing the effect of case type in each condition (N = 200 in 
each condition). In the corroborative condition, participants assigned greater support to the 
independent case (relative to dependent), BF10 = 223.23, whilst in the contradicting condition 
there was substantial evidence for a null difference, BF10 = 0.16. This again fits the qualitative 
judgment data, wherein the corroborative case (which is typified by an independent case 
advantage) is easier for participants to determine (confidence was also higher). 
Model Comparison. To address the question of how sufficient this updating is, participant data 
were compared to BIBN model predictions (dashed lines, Fig. 5). To appropriately explore model 
fit on the individual level, a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA (as in Harris et al., 2014) was 
conducted on probability estimates with the additional inclusion of data type (Participant vs. 
BIBN prediction) as a within-subject factor (N = 2400). 
Decisive evidence was found for the main effect of data type, BFInclusion > 150, indicating 
participant probability estimates were generally lower than the predictions of their BIBN models, 




fitting with other findings of under-adjustment. Decisive evidence was also found for the 
interaction of data type and elicitation stage (indicating the insufficient updating increased over 
stages), BFInclusion > 150, condition (participant updating was more insufficient in the 
corroborating condition), BFInclusion > 150, and their 3-way interaction (the greater insufficiency 
of updating in the corroborating condition occurs in second report state), BFInclusion > 150. Data 
type did not interact with case (dependent or independent) both in isolation, BFInclusion = 0.041, 
or in conjunction with other factors. Accordingly, the model combining ModelP with data type 
and the evidenced interactions above yielded the comparatively strongest fit, BFM = 914.89, with 
decisive evidence overall, BF10 = 1.49 * 10
356. Taken together, this demonstrates that participant 
updating was insufficient relative to their BIBN model predictions (i.e., evidence is generally 
undervalued). Further, the interaction with condition (as with participant data alone) motivates 
the restricted analysis of second report estimates only, split by condition (but now also including 
data type). 
In the corroborating condition, decisive evidence was found for the main effects of case 
type (independent > dependent), BFInclusion = 898.02, and data type (model > participant), 
BFInclusion > 150, but not their interaction, BFInclusion = 0.90. Thus, the model consisting of the two 
main effects only provided the comparatively strongest fit, BFM = 17.71, with decisive evidence 
overall, BF10 = 3.54 * 10
41. This indicates that although participants generally undervalue the 
impact of a second, corroborative report, their assessment of the greater support provided in 
independent (relative to dependent) cases is broadly in line with model predictions. Conversely, 
in the contradicting condition, there was no evidence for a main effect of data type, BFInclusion = 
1.183, and strong evidence for the null for both the main effect of case type, BFInclusion = 0.08, 
and their interaction, BFInclusion = 0.039. Consequently, the model consisting solely of data type 
was the comparatively strongest fit, BFM = 5.26, but there was no evidence for this model overall, 
BF10 = 1.75. Although this appears to indicate a reasonable fit between participant data and model 




predictions for contradicting evidence cases, such a null difference may in fact be attributable to 
under-valuing evidence twice, rather than accurate updating.12  
2.3. Discussion 
We find that lay people generally endorse the assumption that correct information passed to a 
recipient source from a secondary source (of equal reliability) will decrease the likelihood of 
error in the recipient, as determined by the elicited conditional probabilities. We find also that 
there is substantial variance in participant estimations of the degree to which a recipient source 
will be misled by incorrect information; this may be an indicator of the different context-based 
assumptions participants are making (i.e., different perceptions of the influence of background 
information).  
Critically, we show that the majority of participants should, according to their own BIBN 
model predictions, also judge dependencies as advantageous (in terms of the degree of support 
provided to the hypothesis) in both partial and contradicting information states. However, we 
find that participants fail to appreciate this implication in their qualitative judgments, instead 
eschewing preferences for dependence (which is only appropriate in complete-corroborating 
information states). We find confidence in these judgments (irrespective of accuracy) to generally 
be high, with the exception that contradicting cases are marked by lower confidence relative to 
corroborating equivalents – an indicator of the increased difficulty of the former. 
Finally, we find that participant probability estimates fit with previous findings on under-
adjustment in the face of new evidence (e.g., Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Importantly, participant 
probability estimates in partial and contradicting information states reveal a preference to assign 
more support (wrongly) to the independent case, substantiating the qualitative judgment findings. 
 
12 A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA of first to second report estimates in the contradicting condition reveals 
an interaction of data type with elicitation stage from first report to second report, BFInclusion = 1.95 * 10
15, 
highlighting the differential in updating between data and model prediction. 




3. Experiment 2 
We further assessed the robustness of these findings in Experiment 2.  
First, to test the generalisability of elicited conditional probabilities, as well as subsequent 
judgment and probability estimate findings of Experiment 1, the primary hypothesis under 
investigation, which was previously always whether the crash was due to sabotage, was now 
counterbalanced between-subjects as either the crash was due to an accident, or the crash was 
due to sabotage. In conjunction with this, the conditional probabilities elicited were expanded 
from two to four questions to reflect all possible states of the world. Previously, these were only 
concerned with changes in Bailey’s chance of error when provided with correct/incorrect 
information from Campbell, but now this was separated also out by hypothesis (i.e., whether 
Campbell was correct/incorrect about the crash being due to sabotage / an accident). In this way 
it was possible to detect potential hypothesis-specific trends.  
Second, the order or reports was manipulated between subjects, such that at the partial 
information stage (one report back) half the participants saw a report from Bailey (as in 
Experiment 1), and the other half saw Campbell’s report. This allowed us to distinguish between 
patterns of judgments and estimates caused by the presentation of partial information in general, 
and patterns of judgments made as a consequence of partial information pertaining to the recipient 
source specifically. To elucidate, it allows us to determine whether previously observed 
difficulties in dealing with partial information are a result of that partial information coming from 
a potentially dependent source, or are more general. Further, we could also detect whether the 
sequence of reports (e.g., Bailey first or second) affected judgments and estimates at t2 (i.e., 
whether errors at t2 were a consequence of which source reported at t1). 
Whilst the changes regarding the hypothesis of interest (accident vs sabotage) are not 
predicted to have any influence on results (both in terms of counterbalancing and conditional 
probabilities for the two hypotheses being the same), the order of reports is expected to have 




specific impact at the first report (partial information) stage. More precisely, when presented with 
Bailey first, then results should echo those of Experiment 1 (participants failing to appreciate 
instances of dependency advantages), but when presented with Campbell first, there should be 
no difference between independent and dependent cases. This is expected to be more intuitive to 
participants, as no uncertain inference across the dependency is required (i.e., the value of 
Campbell’s report is independent of whether or not Bailey has seen it). 
3.1. Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using the same protocol as in Experiment 1. A sample 
size of 200 was predetermined, in line with Experiment 1. Of the 203 participants recruited, 3 were 
removed for either not having English as a native language, and/or being based outside of the US. 
Of the 200 remaining participants, 124 identified as female. The median age was 30 years (SD = 
10.59). Participants were paid $1.00 for their time (Median = 8.94 minutes, SD = 6.59). 
Procedure & Design. The procedure and design of Experiment 2 followed that of Experiment 
1, with the following exceptions: 
First, the conditional probability questions presented to participants at the beginning of 
the task are now separated by hypothesis. These four (rather than two) questions are as follows: 
1. “The plane did in fact crash due to sabotage, and Campbell CORRECTLY reports the 
crash as being caused by sabotage. Bailey has seen Campbell's report. What 
do you estimate is the probability of Bailey then INCORRECTLY reporting that the 
plane crashed due to an accident? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it 
would be 20%)” 
2. “The plane did in fact crash due to an accident, and Campbell CORRECTLY 
reports the crash as being caused by an accident. Bailey has seen Campbell's report. 
What do you estimate is the probability of Bailey then INCORRECTLY reporting that 




the plane crashed due to sabotage? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it 
would be 20%)” 
3. “The plane did in fact crash due to sabotage, and Campbell INCORRECTLY 
reports the crash as being caused by an accident. Bailey has seen Campbell's report. 
What do you estimate is the probability of Bailey then INCORRECTLY reporting that 
the plane crashed due to an accident? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it 
would be 20%)” 
4. “The plane did in fact crash due to an accident, and Campbell INCORRECTLY 
reports the crash as being caused by sabotage. Bailey has seen Campbell's report. What 
do you estimate is the probability of Bailey then INCORRECTLY reporting that the 
plane crashed due to sabotage? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it would 
be 20%)” 
Second, whether the first report confirmed sabotage or accident was counterbalanced (hereafter 
referred to as the target hypothesis condition), and the qualitative comparison judgement and 
probability estimate questions matched this by asking about support provided for / probability of 
sabotage or accident respectively. Thus, in the accident target hypothesis condition, ACCIDENT 
was replaced by SABOTAGE. 
For qualitative judgments, participants in this condition saw the question:  
“Based on what you know at this point, which case (if either) provides more support 
for the plane having crashed due to ACCIDENT?”. 
For probability estimates, the same participants saw the questions:  
“What is your current probability estimate of the plane having crashed because of 
ACCIDENT in each case, given what you know so far? Click the bars below, indicating 




between 0% (left-most point) and 100% (right-most point). 
Probability of crash due to SABOTAGE in Case 2 (%) [Slider 0 -100%] 
Probability of crash due to SABOTAGE in Case 1 (%) [Slider 0 -100%]” 
Third, which investigator provided the first report was also manipulated between-subjects 
(hereafter referred to as reporter order condition), such that half the participants received a report 
from Bailey first (as in Experiment 1), and the other half received a report from Campbell first. 
As in Experiment 1, whether the second report agreed (corroboration) or disagreed 
(contradiction) with the first was also manipulated between subjects. 
3.2. Results 
The analytical procedure follows that of Experiment 1, with the further addition of the between-
subjects factors; target hypothesis, and reporter order. The former is not expected to influence 
results, and as such given the absence of a main effect, will be removed as a factor from all 
subsequent analyses. 
3.2.1. Conditional probabilities 
Following the same protocol as Experiment 1, and further evidenced by Fig. 6 and Shapiro-Wilk 
p-values < 0.001, to reduce right-hand skew, all estimates were log transformed prior to analysis. 
We then tested whether the target hypothesis condition affected the degree to which participants’ 
estimates of the conditional probabilities for source accuracy (i.e., given dependent reports) 
differed from the experimenter provided rates for the individual, independent sources, using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA (correct/incorrect x sabotage/accident). Whilst a decisive evidence 
for a main effect was found for the influence of correct vs incorrect information, BFInclusion = 
7.755 * 1039, strong evidence for the null was found for the influence of hypothesis, BFInclusion = 
0.076. Consequently, the model with only a main effect of correct vs incorrect information was 
the best fit, BFM = 46.66, and decisive overall, BF10 = 7.785 * 10
39. 





Figure 6. Density plots of the elicited conditional probabilities of the expected error rate for a dependent 
source (Bailey) with a standard (independent) error rate of 20% (vertical solid black line), when provided 
with correct (green) or incorrect (red) information from a second source (Campbell), split by target 
hypothesis condition. 
 
A series of Bayesian t-tests were then used to determine whether participants’ estimates of source 
accuracy given a second (corroborating or conflicting report) differed from the 20% error in the 
independent case (log transformed to a value of 1.322), so as to determine the degree to which 
participants estimated correct or incorrect information to assist or mislead a recipient. First, very 
strong evidence is found for a difference (expected decrease in error rates) when correct 
information is provided in either the sabotage (N = 200, M = 1.216, 95% CI: [1.159, 1.272]), BF10 
= 52.82, or accident hypotheses, (N = 200, M = 1.2, 95% CI: [1.14, 1.261]), BF10 = 132.18. 
Conversely, decisive evidence is found for the expected increase in error rates given incorrect 
information in both sabotage (N = 200, M = 1.487, 95% CI: [1.447, 1.527]), BF10 = 1.313 * 10
11, 
and accident (N = 200, M = 1.495, 95% CI: [1.455, 1.535]), BF10 = 9.847 * 10
11, hypotheses. 
This suggests, in replication of Experiment 1, that participants generally considered recipients to 




be compromised by incorrect information and assisted by correct information – irrespective of 
hypothesis. 
3.2.2. Qualitative judgments 
Following the analysis protocol of Experiment 1, participant’s qualitative judgments were first 
analyzed using contingency tables to assess the influence of elicitation stages and conditions 
(contradicting/corroborating second reports, reporter order, and target hypothesis 
counterbalancing). Following this, the analyses assess how participant judgments compared to 
those expected by BIBN models across elicitation stages. As in Experiment 1, this was first 
assessed at the group level (proportions of judgments, using contingency tables), followed by the 
individual level (internal coherence, using Binomial tests). 
Participant Judgments. Accordingly, using a series of Bayesian contingency tables (N = 600), 
strong evidence was found for the effect of elicitation stage on participant judgments, BF10 = 
11.93, and substantial evidence for the effect of reporter order condition, BF10 = 3.88. As 
expected, there was substantial evidence for a null effect of target hypothesis counterbalancing, 
BF10 = 0.145, and as such this factor is removed from subsequent analyses. Although there was 
also strong evidence for a null effect of second report condition, BF10 = 0.051, this may be 
attributable to the condition only occurring at the final elicitation stage. 
Illustrated below in Fig. 7 are the qualitative judgments of participants (dark grey bars), 
and their BIBN model predictions (light grey bars) based on the elicited conditional probabilities 
of those same participants.  
In line with Experiment 1, we find that participants generally eschew judgments of dependence 
being superior (dark grey bars, Fig. 7). Although this is appropriate (vis-à-vis BIBN model 
predictions; light grey bars, Fig. 7) in cases where dependence is either inferior (corroborating 
reports) or irrelevant (Campbell is the sole reporter; First Report, Campbell First facet), this is 
naïve in the face of cases where dependencies may yield an informational advantage (Bailey is 




the sole reporter; First Report, Bailey First facet; and when reports contradict). These 
discrepancies are borne out in the group-level contingency table analyses of participant vs model 
predictions across elicitation stages.  
Model Comparisons. In fact, decisive evidence was found for participant judgments differing 
from those predicted by their BIBN models at baseline (a substantial number of participants 
erroneously not selecting “same”; N = 400), BF10 = 2.197 * 10
31. Substantial evidence was found 
for this deviation when Bailey reports first (insufficient number of participant judgments for 
dependent case advantage, in line with Experiment 1; N = 202), BF10 = 4.964, and decisive 
evidence was found for this deviation when Campbell reports first (insufficient appreciation for 
the independent and dependent cases being the same; N = 198), BF10 = 4.553 * 10
8. As there was 
strong evidence for a null effect of reporter order on participant judgments at the second report 
stage (N = 200), BF10 = 0.062, these conditions were collapsed to investigate corroborating and 
contradicting second reports. In the former, corroboration led to strong evidence for there being 
too few independent case advantage judgments among participants (N = 194), BF10 = 24.15, and 
in the latter, there was decisive evidence for contradiction leading to too few judgments of both 
dependence and independence (N = 206), BF10 = 6.649 * 10
9.  





Figure 7. Frequency plots of qualitative comparison judgments, split by elicitation stage (t0, t1, t2), 
reporter order (from t1 onwards; middle column), and corroborating vs contradicting second report 
conditions (right-hand column). Dark bars represent participant responses, grey bars represent 




corresponding responses generated from the individually fitted Bayes net models (BIBN). Dashed line 
represents chance level (33%). 
 
Internal Coherence. To confirm these deviations (and to be in line with the analysis protocol of 
Experiment 1), participant vs model comparisons were assessed on the individual level using 
Binomial tests. More precisely, if participant judgment and the BIBN judgment for that 
participant agreed, then the judgment was marked as correct (1), but if they failed to agree, were 
marked as incorrect (0). This variable could then be compared to chance (.33) for performance 
comparison. Consequently, decisive evidence was found for performance at baseline being 
greater than chance level (0.525, 95% CI: [0.456, 0.593]; N = 200), BF10 = 845,142.3. Then when 
Bailey reported first, substantial evidence for the null was found (0.376, 95% CI: [0.288, 0.474]; 
N = 101), BF10 = 0.193, whilst no evidence was found when Campbell reported first (0.414, 95% 
CI: [0.322, 0.513]; N = 99), BF10 = 0.568. Similarly, no evidence was found for performance 
differing from chance when reports corroborated (0.412, 95% CI: [0.319, 0.512]; N = 97), BF10 
= 0.523, whilst substantial evidence for the null was found when reports contradicted (0.282, 
95% CI: [0.204, 0.375]; N = 103), BF10 = 0.194. In sum, although dependency advantages are 
overlooked in specific partial and contradicting information states, they appear to be part of a 
general trend in inaccuracy when considering cases of direct dependence. 
3.2.3. Confidence in qualitative judgments 
As in Experiment 1, confidence in qualitative judgments was generally high across all judgments 
(M = 67.69, SD = 24.36). An initial Bayesian ANOVA found substantial evidence for a null effect 
of target hypothesis counterbalancing condition (N = 600), BF10 = 0.239, as expected, and was 
thus excluded from further analysis. In a second Bayesian ANOVA (N = 600), confidence was 
also again shown to be unaffected by judgment, BFInclusion = 0.262, elicitation stage, BFInclusion = 
0.011, reporter order condition, BFInclusion = 0.229, and second report condition, BFInclusion = 0.086, 




with substantial to very strong evidence for the null for these main effects, and their interaction 
terms. Also, as in Experiment 1, there was very strong evidence for confidence being higher when 
second reports (N = 200) were corroborative (M = 75.26, SD = 21.75) as opposed to contradicting 
(M = 62.47, SD = 26.08), BF10 = 96.58. This again speaks to the higher error rates in judgments 
when evidence is contradictory, as well as to the idea that contradictory evidence is generally 
more difficult to integrate. 
3.2.4. Probability estimates 
As in Experiment 1, participant probability estimates of the likelihood of sabotage in the two 
different cases (dependent and independent; grey vs black lines, Fig. 9) across elicitation stages 
(baseline, first report, and second report; within-facet, Fig. 9) were assessed using a Bayesian 
repeated measures ANOVA. Initially, this model included only the target hypothesis 
counterbalancing condition to check for unexpected influence on probability estimates. Having 
found strong evidence for no influence of target hypothesis counterbalancing (N = 1200), 
BFInclusion = 0.029, this factor was excluded from subsequent analyses. Consequently, a first 
model that included the two within-subject factors (case and elicitation stage), as well as the two 
between-subject factors (second report condition; facet rows, Fig. 9, and reporter order; facet 
columns, Fig. 9). In a follow up analysis, participant BIBN model predictions were included as a 
further within-subject factor. 
Participant Estimates. The first analysis, focusing on participant estimates alone (solid lines, 
Fig. 9; N = 1200), revealed decisive evidence for main effects of elicitation stage (increasing 
trend from baseline to second report), BFInclusion > 150, and second report condition (corroborating 
> contradicting), BFInclusion = 2.891 * 10
14, whilst there was no effect of reporter order condition, 
BFInclusion = 0.572, and substantial evidence for anull effect of case type (dependent = 
independent), BFInclusion = 0.303. Consequently, there was only decisive evidence for the 
interaction of elicitation stage and second report condition (the increasing trend across stages is 




more substantial in the corroborating condition), BFInclusion = 2.405 * 10
13, and the strong evidence 
for the three-way interaction of elicitation stage, second report condition, and reporter order 
condition (the difference in trends between corroborating and contradicting conditions is more 
pronounced when Campbell has reported first), BFInclusion = 17.33. The model containing the 
requisite terms for this three-way interaction, along with case type and its interaction with 
reporter order, enjoyed the strongest fit, BFM = 85.65, was decisive overall, BF10 = 4.928 * 10
25, 
and is hereafter termed ModelP2. Taken together, we find participants are sensitive to introduced 
evidence, both via sequential presentation, and of valence (positive or negative support provided), 
including the degree to which these factors may be influenced by reporter order. However, these 
estimates do not differ on the basis of case type (independent / dependent). 
 





Figure 8. Mean participant estimates of the probability of sabotage across elicitation stages (t0, t1, t2), 
split by contradicting vs corroborating second report conditions (rows) and reporter order (Bailey first vs 
Campbell first) conditions (columns). Dashed lines reflect BIBN model predictions, whilst solid lines 
reflect participant estimates. Grey lines illustrate probability estimates for the dependent case, and black 
lines probability estimates for the independent case. Error bars reflect standard error. 
 
Model Comparisons. To assess the degree to which participant estimates deviated from 
normative expectation, the BIBN model predictions for each participant were added to the above 




analysis protocol (dashed lines, Fig. 9; included as an additional factor; data type). However, 
given the size of the resultant ANOVA, the analyses are split by reporter order condition 
(columns, Fig. 9), with results focusing on the effect terms involving the BIBN model 
comparison. Irrespective of reporter order condition, we find the same trend of results. More 
precisely, this analysis found decisive evidence for a main effect of data type (model predictions 
> participant estimates) when Bailey reports first (N = 1212), BFInclusion = 3.423 * 10
11, and when 
Campbell reports first (N = 1188), BFInclusion = 4.306 * 10
36. This deviation (wherein participants 
underestimate the value of evidence) increased over elicitation stages, (Bailey first reporter) 
BFInclusion = 1.431 * 10
14, and (Campbell first reporter) BFInclusion = 3.012 * 10
23. These 
underestimation trends were more pronounced in the corroborating conditions, (Bailey first 
reporter) BFInclusion = 8.846 * 10
11, and (Campbell first reporter) BFInclusion = 1588.91.  
Although ModelP2 illustrated that participants were sensitive to the sequence and direction 
of evidence, the above shows that this sensitivity is generally insufficient. This is further 
evidenced by the strongly to decisively evidenced interactions of data type and second report 
condition in both the Bailey first reporter, BFInclusion = 53.31, and Campbell first reporter, 
BFInclusion = 474.21, conditions. However, as case type (dependent vs independent; grey vs black 
line, Fig. 9) was not found to interact with data type, this suggests that the lack of differentiation 
between independent and dependent cases among participants at the aggregated (group) level is 
not predicted by their aggregated BIBN model predictions.  
The models that only included all the above terms (and their requisite base-terms) enjoyed 
the strongest fit, (Bailey first reporter) BFM = 255.71, and (Campbell first reporter) BFM = 
1728.56, and were decisive overall, (Bailey first reporter) BF10 = 4.108 * 10
105, and (Campbell 
first reporter) BF10 = 2.795 * 10
199. 





The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test the robustness of the effects found in Experiment 1 by 
manipulating the target hypothesis (sabotage vs accident), and checking for whether this 
influenced the elicited conditional probabilities and subsequent judgments and estimates. Further, 
we tested participant sensitivity to the order of reporters (Bailey first, vs Campbell first), and 
replicated Experiment 1 findings. 
Importantly, we find no influence of target hypothesis across all dependent variables, and 
further show that conditional probabilities (i.e., the general endorsement of assumptions 
regarding the influence of dependencies) are not influenced by target hypothesis either (see Fig. 
6), speaking to the validity of Experiment 1 findings. 
Turning first to qualitative judgments, we find participants are sensitive to the order of 
reporters, with more participants correctly appreciating that independent and dependent cases are 
equivalent when only a sending source (Campbell) has reported. Furthermore, we replicate the 
general findings of Experiment 1, wherein participants fail to appreciate the dependency 
advantages dictated by their own (elicited) assumptions when only a receiving source has 
reported (Bailey), or the two reports contradict. We again note that participant confidence in their 
judgments (irrespective of accuracy) remains high throughout the task. 
Participant probability estimates reveal that although participants are sensitive to the 
sequence and valence of evidence, their updates are generally insufficient relative to their fitted 
(BIBN) model predictions. We additionally note that when looking at the group level data for 
probability estimates (Fig. 8), differences in independent versus dependent case estimates are not 
readily apparent (a trend that fits with the difficulties in determining dependency advantages in 
the qualitative judgment data). 




4. Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we looked at a somewhat idealised scenario in which the two sources 
(when independent) were exactly equal in their reliability. Given the integral nature of the 
assumption (also held by participants) that the reliability of a source is altered when a direct 
dependency is present, a logical follow-on is to explore the assumptions (and subsequent potential 
dependency advantages) when sources are unequal in their reliability. For instance, if we consider 
a higher and lower reliability pair of sources (e.g., a senior vs junior doctor), then there is an 
intuitive difference in the assumed impact of a directional dependency between them. More 
precisely, information of a diagnosis from a senior doctor, passed on to a junior is more likely to 
reduce the latter’s probability of making a mistake, whilst the reverse (junior to senior) is 
arguably less probable. 
These intuitions also expose the incorporation of further background information (e.g., 
the perception of the reliability of the senior by the junior, and vice versa). As a consequence, we 
again return to the method of extracting the conditional probabilities on the individual level to 
create the Bayesian comparison.  
In line with these intuitions we predict that when a recipient source is lower in reliability 
than a sending source, participants will make the same assumptions as in Experiments 1 and 2 
(i.e., the chance of error in the recipient is reduced by correct information and increased by 
incorrect). However, when the recipient is higher in reliability than the sender, we expect there 
to be muted influence of the sender on the recipient’s error rates (i.e. the senior doctor is neither 
assisted nor misled by notes from the junior doctor, when they can also both assess the patient).  
4.1. Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using the same protocol as in Experiment 1. A sample 
size of 200 was predetermined, in line with Experiment 1. Of the 201 participants recruited (50 




per group, see below), 102 were female. The median age was 32 years (SD = 11.46). Participants 
were paid $1.00 for their time (Median = 8.54 minutes, SD = 5.51). 
Procedure & Design. The procedure and design of Experiment 3 followed that of Experiment 
1, with the following exception: 
In the present experiment, only one of either Bailey or Campbell was stipulated to be as 
reliable as in Experiments 1 and 2 (20% error rates), with the other was stipulated as being higher 
in reliability (5% error rates). Whether the recipient (Bailey) or the sender (Campbell) was the 
higher reliability of the two was manipulated between-subjects [Recipient High Reliability; RHR 
/ Sender High Reliability; SHR]. This difference was described as follows (recipient high 
reliability condition shown, low in braces): 
“Secondly, the analysis is notoriously difficult, and Bailey and Campbell differ in their reliability: 
- Bailey has a 5% [20%] probability of mistakenly indicating that sabotage has occurred 
(and a 5% [20%] probability of mistakenly indicating sabotage has not occurred). 
- Campbell has a 20% [5%] probability of mistakenly indicating that sabotage has occurred 
(and a 20% [5%] probability of mistakenly indicating sabotage has not occurred).” 
This change led to one further amendment to the procedure, wherein the elicitation of conditional 
also included a further reminder of the recipient reliability: 
1. “If Bailey, before making her report, has seen Campbell's completed report - when that 
report is in fact CORRECT - what do you estimate is the probability of Bailey making a 
mistake now? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it would be 5% [20%])” 
2. “If Bailey, before making her report, has seen Campbell's completed report - when that 
report is in fact INCORRECT - what do you estimate is the probability of Bailey making 
a mistake now? (Remember: Without seeing Campbell's report, it would be 5% [20%])” 





The analytical procedure follows that of Experiment 1, with the further addition of a between-
subjects factor; reliability difference. 
4.2.1. Conditional probabilities 
Using a series of Bayesian t-tests, participants’ estimates of the conditional probabilities were 
compared relative to the report recipient’s stipulated rate for the independent case (5% in the 
RHR condition, and 20% in the SHR condition) to determine the degree to which participants 
estimated correct or incorrect information from a high/low reliability sender to assist or mislead 
a low/high reliability recipient. Once more, given the right-hand skew evident in Fig. 9, and 
further evidenced by Shapiro-Wilk p-values < 0.001, in accordance with Experiments 1 and 2, 
all data and test values were log transformed (x -> log(x + 1), to combat 0 values) prior to analysis. 
 
Figure 9. Density plots of the elicited conditional probabilities of the expected error rate for a dependent 
source (Bailey), when provided with correct (green) or incorrect (red) information from a second source 
(Campbell). Solid black lines reflect independent recipient (Bailey) source error rates, such that an in the 
recipient high reliability condition (left-hand facet) the independent recipient error rate is 5% (and the 
sender has an error rate of 20%), whilst in the sender high reliability condition (right-hand facet) the 
independent recipient error rate is 20% (and the sender has an error rate of 5%).. 





Turning first to the RHR condition (left-hand facet of Fig. 9), relative to the 5% starting 
(independent) error rate of the recipient (log value = 0.778), when the sender provided incorrect 
information (red distribution), recipient error rates were judged to increase (N = 101, M = 1.165, 
95% CI: [1.092, 1.237]), BF10 = 9.341 * 10
14. However, when the sender provided correct 
information (green distribution), participants still judged the recipient error rates to increase (N 
= 101, M = 0.974, 95% CI: [0.884, 1.064]), BF10 = 465.18. This suggests participants considered 
high reliability recipients to always be compromised by lower reliability sources, irrespective of 
the veracity of the information provided by the latter, however, this influence appears to be 
somewhat muted (with the distribution peaks remaining around the original 5% independent error 
rates). 
In the converse condition, when the sender is high in reliability (SHR; and the recipient 
lower in reliability; right-hand facet of Fig. 9), elicited conditional probabilities are instead 
compared to the 20% (independent) starting error rate of the recipient (log value = 1.322). In this 
condition, when the sender passes on incorrect information (red distribution), recipient error rates 
are again judged to increase (N = 101, M = 1.425, 95% CI: [1.36, 1.49]), BF10 = 11.10. However, 
when the sender passes on correct information (green distribution), substantial evidence is found 
for a decrease in recipient error rates, in line with Experiments 1 and 2 (N = 101, M = 1.214, 95% 
CI: [1.14, 1.29]), BF10 = 4.99. Consequently, when extracted for use in the individual model fits 
(BIBN process, see Experiment 1), it is expected that this latter condition should yield the same 
overall model prediction of a dependency advantage in the partial and contradicting information 
states. 
Thus, we may conclude that participants generally endorse assumption 2 (and 3). More 
precisely, participants consider receiving sources to be more accurate when provided with correct 
information from a sending source. However, this is only endorsed when the sender is more 




accurate than the receiver (the sender being more likely to be accurate generally, and the receiver 
having more capacity to be improved by correct information). 
4.2.2. Qualitative judgments 
Following the analysis protocol of Experiment 1, participants qualitative judgments were first 
analyzed using contingency tables to assess the influence of elicitation stages and conditions 
(both contradicting / corroborating, and recipient/sender high reliability). Following this, the 
analyses are split by reliability condition (given the different conditional probabilities 
underpinning them) to assess how participant judgments compared to those expected by BIBN 
models across elicitation stages. As in Experiment 1, this was first assessed at the group level 
(proportions of judgments, using contingency tables), followed by the individual level (internal 
coherence, using Binomial tests). 
Participant Judgments. Accordingly, using a series of Bayesian contingency tables (N = 603), 
very strong evidence for the null was found for the effect on participant judgments of elicitation 
stage, BF10 = 0.028, or reliability condition, BF10 = 0.064. However, whether the second report 
contradicted or corroborated the first (N = 201) was again found to have a substantial effect on 
participant judgments (more preferences for the independent scenario in the corroboration 
condition), BF10 = 3.29. Although the former of these findings depart from those found in 
Experiment 1, this may be attributable to the collapsing across reliability conditions, and not 
unexpected given the higher variance entailed. 
Sender High Reliability. Fig. 10 below illustrates the qualitative judgments of participants (dark 
grey bars), and their BIBN model predictions (light grey bars) based on the elicited conditional 
probabilities of those same participants. In line with Experiments 1 and 2, both the partial (first 
report) and contradicting information states show a modal preference in the BIBN model 
predictions for the dependent case, whilst this is not the case in the participant judgments 




themselves. These discrepancies are borne out in the group-level contingency table analyses of 
participant vs model predictions across elicitation stages.  
Model Comparisons. In fact, participant judgments were found to decisively differ from those 
predicted by their BIBN models at baseline (a substantial number of participants erroneously not 
selecting “same”; N = 200), BF10 = 9.61 * 10
17, and first report (insufficient number of participant 
judgments for “dependent” case advantage, in line with Experiments 1 and 2; N = 200), BF10 = 
889.80, stages. Strong evidence was also found for this deviation at the corroborating second 
report stage (too few “independent” case advantage judgments among participants; N = 100), 
BF10 = 19.59, and very strongly differ at contradicting second report stage (too few “dependent” 
case advantage judgments among participants, in line with Experiments 1 and 2; N = 100), BF10 
= 81.84. Taken together, these suggest participants not only failed to adequately understand the 
dependency advantage implications when information was partial or contradictory, but more 
generally had difficulty with comparing independent and dependent cases when reliabilities differ 
between sources. 
 




Figure 10. Frequency plots of qualitative comparison judgments in the Sender High Reliability condition, 
split by elicitation stage (t0, t1, t2) and (at t2) corroborating vs contradicting second report condition. Dark 
bars represent participant responses, grey bars represent corresponding responses generated from the 
individually fitted Bayes net models (BIBN). Dashed line represents chance level (33%). 
 
Internal Coherence. To confirm this supposition (and to be in line with the analysis protocol of 
Experiment 1), participant vs model comparisons were assessed on the individual level using 
Binomial tests. More precisely, if participant judgment and the BIBN judgment for that 
participant agreed, then the judgment was marked as correct (1), but if they failed to agree, were 
marked as incorrect (0). This variable could then be compared to chance (.33) for performance 
comparison. Consequently, no evidence was found for performance at baseline differing from 
chance level (0.45, 95% CI: [0.36, 0.55]; N = 100), BF10 = 2.75, and substantial evidence for the 
null was found at the partial (first report) stage (0.34, 95% CI: [0.26, 0.44]; N = 100), BF10 = 
0.12, second report corroborating stage (0.34, 95% CI: [0.22, 0.48]; N = 50), BF10 = 0.17, and 
second report contradicting stage (0.36, 95% CI: [0.24, 0.50]; N = 50), BF10 = 0.19. In sum, 
although dependency advantages are overlooked in the partial and contradicting cases, they 
appear to be part of a general trend in inaccuracy, possibly stemming from the added complexity 
of a difference in reliability between sources. 
Recipient High Reliability. As can be seen in Fig. 11, when the recipient source is higher in 
reliability, the conditional probabilities elicited from participants result in BIBN model 
predictions that favor independence across corroborating and partial (first report) and 
contradicting information states (light grey bars in central and right-hand facets). This is 
unsurprising given that the sufficient assumptions (namely that recipient sources are assisted by 
correct information to a greater or equal degree than they are misled by incorrect information) 
are not met in this condition. 




Model Comparisons. The potential discrepancies between participant judgments and BIBN 
model predictions at the group level (i.e., the overall frequency of judgments) were again assessed 
using Bayesian contingency tables. Consequently, we once again find participant judgments 
decisively differ from BIBN predictions at baseline (insufficient “same” judgments among 
participants; N = 202), BF10 = 5.57 * 10
12, strongly differ at first report (insufficient 
“independent” case advantage judgments among participants; N = 202), BF10 = 11.12, 
corroborating second report (insufficient “independent” case advantage judgments among 
participants; N = 102), BF10 = 21.24, and decisively at contradicting second report (again, 
insufficient “independent” case advantage judgments among participants; N = 100), BF10 = 
1357.38, stages. Taken together, this again speaks to the explanation that as information states 
entail greater complexity when making an inference about the value of a dependency (i.e. partial 
and contradictory information states) erroneous responding increases, as although the modal 
participant judgments match those expected by BIBN models in baseline (“same”), first report 
(“independent”), and second report corroborating stages (“independent”), there is still a 
significant degree of error (despite independence dominance) – particularly notable in the more 
complex contradictory second report condition (where participant modal preferences for “same” 
are misplaced). 





Figure 11. Frequency plots of qualitative comparison judgments in the Recipient High Reliability 
condition, split by elicitation stage (t0, t1, t2) and (at t2) corroborating vs contradicting second report 
condition. Dark bars represent participant responses, grey bars represent corresponding responses 
generated from the individually fitted Bayes net models (BIBN). Dashed line represents chance level 
(33%). 
 
Internal Coherence. As in the sender high reliability condition, participant judgments were 
assessed relative to BIBN model predictions on the individual level (via the creation of a correct 
(match) / incorrect (mismatch) variable, to then be compared to chance level (0.33) using 
Bayesian Binomial tests), across elicitation stages. Accordingly, correct responding was found 
to be decisively greater than chance level at baseline (0.56, 95% CI: [0.47, 0.66]; N = 101), BF10 
= 14022.71, and strongly at the first report stage (0.49, 95% CI: [0.39, 0.58]; N = 101), BF10 = 
22.12. However, at the second report stage no evidence was found for correct responding being 
greater than chance level in the corroborating condition (0.47, 95% CI: [0.34, 0.61]; N = 51), 




BF10 = 1.50, nor in the contradicting condition (0.34, 95% CI: [0.22, 0.48]; N = 50), BF10 = 0.17 
(substantial evidence for the null). Taken together, responses were more accurate in the partial 
information state (first report stage) than in the sender high reliability condition (where 
dependence was dominant), but otherwise remained equivalently inaccurate. This latter aspect of 
the results further suggests that the inequality in reliabilities prevented accurate determination of 
which case provided support. 
4.2.3. Confidence in qualitative judgments 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, confidence in qualitative judgments was generally high across all 
judgments (M = 65.36, SD = 26.32). Using a Bayesian ANOVA (N = 603), confidence was also 
again shown to be unaffected by judgment, BFInclusion = 0.003, elicitation stage, BFInclusion = 0.01, 
and reliability condition, BFInclusion = 0.013, with decisive to very strong evidence for the null for 
these main effects, and their interaction terms. Also, as previously, substantial evidence was 
found for confidence again being higher when second reports (N = 201) were corroborative (M 
= 72.56, SD = 26.89) rather than contradicting (M = 62.45, SD = 26.24), BF10 = 4.47. This again 
speaks to the higher error rates in judgments when evidence is contradictory, as well as the more 
general argument that contradictory evidence is more difficult to integrate. 
4.2.4. Probability estimates 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participant probability estimates of the likelihood of sabotage in the 
two different cases (dependent and independent; grey vs black lines, Fig. 12) across elicitation 
stages (baseline, first report, and second report; within-facet, Fig. 12) were assessed using a 
Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA. Initially, a hierarchical model was deployed that included 
the above two within-subject factors (case and elicitation stage), as well as the two between-
subject factors (second report condition; facet rows, Fig. 12, and reliability condition; facet 
columns, Fig. 12). In a follow up analysis, participant BIBN model predictions were included as 
a further within-subject factor. 




Participant Estimates. A Bayesian, repeated-measures ANOVA, including all relevant factors 
(within: case type, elicitation stage; between: reliability and second report conditions) was run 
on participant probability estimates (solid lines, Fig. 12; N = 1206). This analysis revealed 
decisive evidence for main main effects of elicitation stage (increasing trend from baseline to 
second report), BFInclusion = 1.156 * 10
15, and second report condition (corroborating > 
contradicting), BFInclusion = 5.196 * 10
11, whilst there was no evidence for an effect of reliability 
condition, BFInclusion = 0.58, and very strong evidence for a null effect of case type (dependent = 
independent), BFInclusion = 0.011. Additionally, there was decisive evidence for the interaction of 
elicitation stage and second report condition (the increasing trend across stages is more 
substantial in the corroborating condition), BFInclusion = 5.196 * 10
11, and strong evidence for a  
three-way interaction of elicitation stage, second report condition, and reliability condition (the 
difference in trends between corroborating and contradicting conditions is more pronounced 
when the sender is higher in reliability), BFInclusion = 11.102.  
Thus, the model containing only the requisite terms to include this three-way interaction 
(i.e., precluding case type and its derivate interactions) enjoyed the strongest fit, BFM = 205.47, 
was decisive overall, BF10 = 2.676 * 10
36, and is hereafter termed ModelP3. Taken together, we 
find participants are sensitive to introduced evidence, both via sequential presentation, and of 
valence (positive or negative support provided), including the degree to which these factors may 
be influenced by strength (i.e., the reliability of reporters). However, these estimates do not differ 
on the basis of case type (independent / dependent). 
 





Figure 12. Mean participant estimates of the probability of sabotage across elicitation stages (t0, t1, t2), 
split by contradicting vs corroborating second report conditions (rows) and reliability (Recipient vs Sender 
high) conditions (columns). Dashed lines reflect BIBN model predictions, whilst solid lines reflect 
participant estimates. Grey lines illustrate probability estimates for the dependent case, and black lines 
probability estimates for the independent case. Error bars reflect standard error. 
 
Model Comparisons. To assess the degree to which participant estimates deviated from 
normative expectation, the BIBN model predictions for each participant were added to the above 
analysis protocol (dashed lines, Fig. 12; included as an additional factor; data type; N = 2412), 




with results focusing on the effect terms involving this comparison. This analysis found decisive 
evidence for a main effect of data type was found (model predictions > participant estimates), 
BFInclusion = 5.07 * 10
13. Decisive evidence was found for this deviation (wherein participants 
underestimate the value of evidence) increasing over elicitation stages, BFInclusion = 8.11 * 10
14, a 
trend further exacerbated by participant failures to sufficiently appreciate the influence of 
reliability (participants’ underestimation is more pronounced when reporters are higher in 
reliability), BFInclusion = 6.25 * 10
15, and the second reporter condition (underestimation trends 
are further pronounced in the corroborating condition), BFInclusion = 6.25 * 10
15. This insensitivity 
is further exposed by decisive evidence for the four-way interaction of data type, elicitation stage, 
reliability and second report conditions, BFInclusion = 3.07 * 10
9, wherein contradiction from higher 
reliability sources (top-right facet, Fig. 12) should entail substantial downward revision, and thus 
participants are overestimating, whilst a lower reliability contradicting source (top-left facet, Fig. 
12) does not negate the prior positive report, and thus participant conservative updates result in 
underestimation. 
Although ModelP3 illustrates that participants are sensitive to evidence factors (sequence, 
valence, and strength), the above shows this sensitivity is generally insufficient. This is further 
shown by the decisive evidence for the interaction of data type and second report condition (high 
reliability contradictors should have a more substantial refuting effect than lower reliability 
contradictors, and corroboration is more impactful from a higher reliability source, but 
participants fail to adequately capture this), BFInclusion = 8.11 * 10
14. Similarly, the decisive 
evidence for the interaction of data type and reliability condition, BFInclusion = 8.11 * 10
14, reflects 
a similar increased deviation from normative expectation when the sender is reliable (right-hand 
column, Fig. 9). Lastly, the decisive evidence for the three-way interaction of data type, second 
report and reliability conditions, BFInclusion = 8.11 * 10
14, reflects the additive nature of these two 
condition-based deviation differences. 




Lastly, substantial evidence was found for the interaction of case type (dependent vs 
independent; grey vs black line, Fig. 12) with data type, BFInclusion = 4.57, indicating an 
insensitivity in participants to account for the superiority of the independent case (relative to 
dependent) – most clearly exemplified by the differences between black and grey dashed lines 
(BIBN models) and the (lack of) differences between black and grey solid lines (participants) in 
the left-hand columns of Fig. 12. This fits with the modal “same” preference in participant 
qualitative judgments – notably in first report and second report stages. Relatedly, the substantial 
evidence for the interaction of case and reliability condition, BFInclusion = 6.14, is again reflective 
of the independent case superiority when the recipient is high in reliability – an effect borne out 
in qualitative judgment BIBN model predictions. 
The model that only included all the above terms (and their requisite base-terms) enjoyed 
the strongest fit, BFM = 15786.45, and was decisive overall, BF10 = 1.52 * 10
376. 
4.3. Discussion 
The introduction of reliability differences between the two sources in Experiment 3 yielded 
further insights into the way in which dependencies are (dis)advantageous. For instance, when a 
sender is higher in reliability than a recipient, participants generally endorse (via elicited 
conditional probability estimates) the same assumptions as in Experiment 1 and 2, wherein the 
(lower reliability) recipient is considered to benefit from correct information when it is passed to 
them by the (higher reliability) sender. As a consequence, we replicate the judgment and 
probability estimate findings of Experiments 1 and 2 (only this time with differences in reliability, 
rather than equal source reliabilities), in that, individual BIBN model predictions point to a 
dependency advantage in cases of partial and contradicting information states, but this advantage 
is still overlooked in participant responses. 
Conversely, we find that in instances where a recipient source is considered to be higher 
in reliability than a sender, participants do not consider such a source to benefit from correct 




information – given that this information originates from a lower reliability source. Instead, the 
impact of a secondary source is considered to have a net negative influence on the recipient (i.e., 
it can only be a detriment to the high reliability recipient’s accuracy, relative to an independent 
equivalent). Consequently, BIBN model judgments and probability estimates then reflect this 
assumption in a global preference for independence across corroborating, partial and 
contradicting information states. 
We find, however, that in participant qualitative judgments (but also corroborated by 
probability estimate data) there is a failure to appreciate this superiority of the independent case 
– most clearly highlighted in the contradicting information state. A majority of participants 
instead consider the cases (dependent and independent) the same.  
This finding suggests two important possibilities. First, the introduction of differing 
reliabilities exposes a potential blanket or heuristic preference for reliability cues over structural 
differences. In this way, less attention is paid to the possible implication of the introduction of a 
direct dependency between the two sources, and thus the two cases are genuinely considered to 
be similar. Second, that high levels of erroneous responding – particularly in partial and 
contradicting information states – are not necessarily tied to the special case of dependency 
advantages, but rather may be more reflective of participants being overwhelmed by the 
complexity of these comparisons. This may be particularly acute when having to consider 
differences in the reliability of sources, and may in turn explain a “shallow, reliability cue” 
strategy outlined above. 
5. General Discussion 
The consideration of dependencies is critical to reasoning accurately about evidence. 
Dependence comes in many forms, such as a sharing of evidence (Schum, 1994) or background 
(Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Madsen, Hahn, & Pilditch, 2018) between sources, or on an 
aggregate level, the degree to which reports are correlated (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977; 




Hogarth, 1978; Berg, 1993; Ladha, 1995). The standard conception of dependencies has been to 
consider their introduction as a form of redundancy (and thus inferior to an independent 
equivalent) in terms of the support provided to a hypothesis. Using a novel approach in which 
we disentangle structural dependence from observation (e.g., observed, correlated reports), we 
make the novel theoretical point that there exist – under reasonable assumptions – dependency 
advantages when observations are either a) partial, or b) contradict one another across a 
dependency relation. We provide a proof for the existence of cases in which these advantages 
hold, and we further demonstrate empirically that many lay reasoners endorse the outlined 
sufficient assumptions. However, we also show that despite endorsing such assumptions, lay 
reasoners struggle, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to understand the dependency advantage 
implications, instead preferring to assume that dependence is inferior.  
Critically, by exploring the impact of dependencies when sources are equally reliable 
(Experiments 1 and 2), and when reliabilities are unequal (Experiment 3), we reveal a more 
nuanced picture of the difficulties of considering reliability, structural dependence, and crucially, 
differences in information states.  
First, we note that sufficient assumptions for dependency advantages are endorsed as a 
function of the reliability of the sources involved. More precisely, when sources are either 
considered equally reliable (Experiment 1 and 2), or the sending source is considered higher in 
reliability than the recipient (Sender High Reliability condition; Experiment 3), then lay reasoners 
generally endorse the assumptions that recipients may benefit from this sharing of information 
(assumption 2; elicited via conditional probabilities) between generally reliable sources 
(assumption 1). As a consequence, in partial and contradicting states of information, a 
dependency advantage should result. However, when a recipient source is considered more 
reliable than the sender (Recipient High Reliability condition; Experiment 3), then reasoners do 
not consider the recipient to gain any meaningful benefit – and thus independence should 




dominate across all information states. This interaction of evidence structure and reliability 
parameters (and the resultant variance in assumptive estimations) points to the difficulties 
intrinsic to considerations of dependencies. However, we note that our formal approach - 
Bayesian networks that disentangle structure from observation, fitted to participant estimations 
of the conditional influence of a dependency – highlights a fruitful avenue for navigating this 
complexity, extracting tailored normative predictions for meaningful comparisons on both the 
individual and group level. 
Second, this disentanglement reveals that reasoners not only fail to appreciate dependency 
advantages in partial and contradicting information states, but such failures may reflect a subset 
of general difficulties in dealing with such information states. This is illustrated by the failure of 
participants to prefer independence when it is entailed by their own assumptions across partial 
and contradicting information states (Recipient High Reliability condition; Experiment 3), 
instead judging there to be no difference between dependent and independent cases. We note the 
potential common psychological difficulty in such cases is that partial and contradicting 
information states are more computationally taxing, requiring the integration across multiple 
possible routes of explanation (i.e., one has to accurately integrate both the possibility that 
incorrect or correct information – unknown to you – has been passed, and its possible influence 
on a receiver), whilst corroborative cases (and sender only partial information states, see 
Experiment 2) may rely on shallower, presence vs absence reasoning. We also note that 
dependency advantage cases (requiring partial or contradicting information) are themselves 
harder to infer from real world “observations” alone, without the supplemental understanding of 
the causal structure inherent to that context. 
The present work has both theoretical and applied ramifications. Our approach and 
accompanying proof, along with the empirical demonstration of the underlying assumptions in 
action, make the novel theoretical point that there exist systematic structural conditions under 




which dependencies are evidentially advantageous. We note that empirical work on individual 
versus collective judgment has shown communication among crowd members to lead to both 
decrements (Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011) and improvements (Jönsson et al., 
2015; Becker, Brackbill, & Centola, 2017) on group accuracy. Formal frameworks such as 
Condorcet’s (1785) Jury Theorem or the Diversity Prediction Theorem (Page, 2008) help 
understand these seeming contradictions, because they clarify the general connections between 
individual accuracy, diversity and group accuracy. These formal results show that diversity of 
perspectives/opinions will enhance group accuracy, and independence of group members will 
generally enhance diversity. At the same time, increasing individual accuracy will also enhance 
group accuracy. So, collective accuracy (“wisdom of the crowds”) will benefit from 
communication wherever the benefits to individual accuracy exceed the reduction in 
diversity/independence. However, the formal results of this paper go beyond those insights in 
several key ways. First, we are not dealing with a collective voting or averaging case as in those 
“wisdom of the crowds” results. Instead, each piece of evidence is being weighted at its 
appropriate degree of reliability. Second, our results identify specific structural constraints on 
dependency relations (namely a unidirectional link between sources) that allow us to identify a 
priori when dependency will help and when it will hurt. In other words, we provide a first 
clarification of how the type of dependency relation itself matters. Of course, further work is 
encouraged to explore more complex forms of dependency relations (e.g., the incorporation of 
theory of mind relations between dependent sources). 
By disentangling different information states (corroborative, but also contradicting and 
partial) and the structural representations of dependencies they may give rise to, we provide a 
new way of thinking about how dependencies fit within evidential reasoning. More precisely, we 
can first develop our understanding of the way in which lay reasoners infer the conditional 
influence of a dependency - as a function of source reliability, evidence-evidence and evidence-
hypothesis structures, as well as various forms of background information. In so doing, we can 




chart the otherwise nebulous territory of dependencies within evidential reasoning. But further, 
so as to complete this picture, the present formalism allows (via the application of probability 
theory) for the comparison of the products of lay reasoning (e.g., judgments and estimations) 
against an informed normative expectation – sidestepping the issue of the potentially intractable 
general normative account of dependence. In this way, we relax the ultimate normative constraint 
for approaching an understanding of dependence (i.e., the extrication of dependence from its 
context), so as to make meaningful in-roads into a psychological understanding of dependence - 
purposefully understanding dependencies (and their implications) within the contexts to which 
they are so inextricably bound. 
Finally, we point to the implications of this work in applied domains of reasoning, 
including forensics, law, intelligence analysis, and medicine (although everyday reasoning is also 
intrinsically affected). First, where the use of formal approaches such as Bayesian Networks are 
feasible, this work makes a strong argument for the value of modelling dependencies in a careful 
and considered manner. Second, where such approaches are not readily applicable, our 
assumptions serve as a note of caution to drawing conclusions based on the naive intuition that 
dependencies are evidentially inferior. 
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A. GENERAL NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS  
To characterise cases of dependency advantages, we take the following models (as illustrated in 
Fig. A.1), wherein the sole difference between the left-hand (independent, ModelI) and right-
hand (dependent, ModelD) is the influence of SC on SB1. 
 
 
Figure. A.1. Graphical representation of a hypothesis (H) with two sources of evidence (SB / SB1, SC) 
informing upon it. The left-hand model (ModelI) represents the independent case, whilst the right-hand 
model (ModelD) represents the dependent case.  
For simplicity we are going to assume ‘symmetry’ of the error probabilities (so we will assume 
the true positive rates are the same as the true negative rates), as this characterizes both the 
experiments in the paper and the proof for the partial independence case below. However, the 
generalisation will be easy to see.  So, in the two models we assume the following: 
The conditional probability tables (CPTs) for SC |H (in both models) and SB |H in ModelI is 
defined as: 
Table. A.1. Conditional probability table (CPT) for the probability of false (bottom row) and true (top 
row) reports from sources, given the hypothesis is false (right-hand column) or true (left-hand column). 
 
𝐻 𝐻 
𝑆 x 1-x 
𝑆̅ 1-x x 





The CPT for (SB1 | H, SC) in ModelD needs to consider not only H, but also the influence of SC’s 
(dis)agreement with H, and is therefore defined as: 
Table A.2. Conditional probability table (CPT) for the probability of false (bottom row) and true (top row) 
reports from SB1, given the hypothesis is false (right-hand pair of columns) and SC (correctly) states it is 
false (right-most column) or SC (falsely) states it is true (middle-right column), or, given the hypothesis 
is true (left-hand pair of columns) and SC (falsely) states it is false (middle-left column) or SC (correctly) 
states it is true (left-most column). 
 𝐻 𝐻 
𝑆𝐶  𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅ 𝑆𝐶  𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅ 
𝑆𝐵1 u v 1-v 1-u 
𝑆𝐵1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 1-u 1-v v u 
 
A.1 Corroboration 
To examine the conditions for dependency advantage in the case of corroboration, it is convenient 
to consider the odds form13 of Bayes’ rule: 
 
Posterior Odds = Likelihood Ratio (LR) x Prior Odds 
 
Considering the odds makes clear that in comparing dependent and independent corroboration 
we do not need to worry about the prior, as it is the same across both cases. So, quite simply, the 
dependent case will provide stronger corroboration when LR_D is greater than LR_I.  
 










The odds form of Bayes’ rule may also be converted back to posterior probabilities via  
𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) =  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 + 1)
 




Given that we have two pieces of evidence (e.g., one report from Bailey and one from Campbell), 
the relevant LRs are those of the two pieces of evidence presented together. This is the product 
of the two individual LRs. 





















i.e., whether the diagnosticity of Bailey has increased as a result of the dependency. 
In the main text above and in our consideration of the partial information case below, we focus 
on the consequences of the plausible assumption that a correct report from Campbell makes 
Bailey more accurate, whereas an incorrect one reduces her reliability, i.e. 
u > x> v 
in this case, whether it does or does not involves two opposing forces: 
- How much bigger is u relative to x (i.e., how much does it help make B more accurate 
when C is correct) (bigger numerator will increase LR for Bailey) 
and 
- How much smaller is v than x (i.e., how much does it HURT B when C is wrong) (because 
the smaller v, the bigger (1-v)…. (bigger denominator will decrease LR for Bailey) 




The winner between these two opposing forces determines whether corroboration helps or 
hinders. 
For a visualisation of the above constraints in action, see also Appendix B. 
A.2 Contradiction 














And whether there is an advantage or a disadvantage is determined by whether u and v are such 
that they make B less diagnostic than C. 
A.3 Partial Information 
In the partial information case, we have the same notation and assumptions as in A.1, including 
‘symmetry’ of the error probabilities, and that both true positives and true negatives are higher 
than 50% (i.e., assumption 1; x > 0.5). 
Following from Table A.2, for this case we therefore assume: 
u > x > v > 0.5 
This inequality is a summary of assumption 1 (all sources are generally accurate) and assumption 
2 (correctly provided information is helpful), where, 
u - x > x - v 
Such that assumption 3, the ‘boost’ in accuracy when provided second-hand information is 
correct, is greater than the ‘drop’ in accuracy when provided second-hand information is 




incorrect. This assumption is necessary for this proof as otherwise the hypothesis is not always 
true. NB: In the experimental studies, assumption 3 is not necessary to induce a dependency 
advantage, this is because the starting accuracy of sources is generally high (0.8). As starting 
accuracies approach the 0.5 threshold, assumption 3 becomes more and more necessary.  
B. VISUALISATION 
Next, we present a visualisation of how dependency gives rise to advantage and disadvantage 
across regions of the parameter space in Fig. B.1 below. The color map represents the degree of 
difference between dependent and independent posterior: differences > 0 reflect a dependency 
advantage; differences < 0 a dependency disadvantage. These differences are shown across all 
possible values of u and v (the conditional reliability of Bailey when Campbell is correct, and 
when Campbell is incorrect, respectively), for three different levels of independent accuracy x. 
Row 3 corresponds to the independent source reliability of .8 used in Exp.1 and 2. Hence mapping 
the distribution plots of Fig. 6 and Fig. 9 main text to the u and v axes will give a sense of the 
outcomes in the BIBNs for those studies.   





Fig. B.1 The plot visualises regions of dependency advantage (Diff > 0) and dependency 
disadvantage (Diff < 0) relative to independent evidence for the corroboration (left panels) and 
partial information case (right panels). X represents the accuracy of the independent source (see 
A.1 above), u represents the reliability of the dependent source where the second report is correct, 
v represents the reliability where that report is false (see Table A2 above). Prior = 5 in all cases. 
Row 3 corresponds to the conditions of Exp. 1 and 2.  






Finally, with the above assumptions, to demonstrate and advantage of the ModelD over ModelI, 
we have to prove the following: 
𝑃(𝐻|S𝐵) < 𝑃(𝐻|𝑆𝐵1) 













                    (𝐴. 1) 
We note here that in proving (A.1), we ensure the requirement that P(SB|H) < P(SB1|H) always 
holds, given our assumptions. Again, to avoid a massively complex proof, we make the 












= 2𝑥      (𝐿𝐻𝑆) 
The RHS of (A.1), however, is more complex because we have to incorporate the conditional 
dependency: 
𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶)𝑃(𝑆𝐶|𝐻) + 𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅)𝑃(𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅|𝐻)
𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶)𝑃(𝑆𝐶|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻) + 𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅)𝑃(𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻) + 𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶)𝑃(𝑆𝐶|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻) + 𝑃(𝑆𝐵1|𝐻, 𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅)𝑃(𝑆𝐶̅̅ ̅|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻) 
 
=
𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑥)
1
2 (𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣
(1 − 𝑥) + (1 − 𝑣)(1 − 𝑥) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑥)
 





𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑥)
1
2
= 2(𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑥))       (𝑅𝐻𝑆) 
Now, considering LHS and RHS, it follows from (A.1) that we have to prove: 
𝑥 < 𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑥) 
Or, equivalently, that 
𝑥 − 𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣 < 0        (𝐴. 2) 
 
To prove (A.2), we note that 
𝑥 − 𝑢𝑥 + 𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣 




(𝑢 + 𝑣)(1 − 𝑢 + 𝑣) − 𝑣           
(the above is a consequent of assumption 3,  𝑢 − 𝑥 > 𝑥 − 𝑣, which implies that 𝑥 <
1
2








(𝑢(1 − 𝑢) + 𝑣(𝑣 − 1))       (𝐴. 3) 
So to prove (A.2) we now only need to prove that (A.3) >= 0, which is the same as proving that: 
𝑢 − 𝑢2 < 𝑣 − 𝑣2     (𝐴. 4) 
But, we know that u > v > 0.5. Hence, we can assume that 
𝑣 = 0.5 + 𝛼  (where 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1) 
and that 




𝑢 = 0.5 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 (where 0 < 𝛼 + 𝛽 ≤ 1) 
Substituting into the LHS of (A.4) we get: 
(0.5 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 ) − (0.5 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 )2
= 0.5 + 𝛼 + 𝛽
− (0.25 + 0.5𝛼 + 0.5𝛽 + +0.5𝛼 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛽 + 0.5𝛽 + 𝛼𝛽 + 𝛽2) 
= 0.25 − 𝛼2 − 2𝛼𝛽 − 𝛽2 
We then get the RHS of (A.4): 
0.5 + 𝛼 − (0.5 + 𝛼)2 =  0.5 + 𝛼 − (0.25 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼) 
= 0.25 − 𝛼2 
Finally, by comparing the LHS and RHS of (A.4) and noting that α and β are both positive, it 
follows that the inequality (A.4) is proven. Quod Erat Demonstrandum.  
